By: Jennifer Z. - Title: Ohio: Authority of Juvenile Court Upon Transfer from Common Please Court

Link for opinion: https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2014/2014-ohio-2597.pdf Title: Ohio: Authority of Juvenile Court Upon Transfer from Common Please Court The Ohio Court of Appeals held that in In re A.G., 139 Ohio St.3d 572, 2014-Ohio-2597 a child is not a proper party in a divorce action or its ancillary custody proceedings, even if she is joined as a party defendant pursuant to CIV.R. 75(B)(2). However, the Court also recognized that even though she is not a party to the action, a child who is the subject of custody litigation arising from a divorce has an interest in the matter. The Court held that in child-custody litigation arising from a divorce, a court has discretion to exclude the child from any proceeding if, the totality of the circumstances; exclusion is in the best interest of that child. The fifteen-year-old daughter of Lolita and Patrick (last name not mentioned in order to protect A.G’s identity) filed a motion to terminate visitation with her father. She is the only child “caught in a web of parental hostility and ongoing conflict.” From June 1998, when Patrick filed for divorce, to January 2011 there had been an array of issues, mostly stemming from Patrick side. In February 1999 Patrick ran away with A.G and as a result he was found in contempt of agreed visitation order and a warrant for his arrest was issued. Patrick was in possession of $55,234 in cash, fake birth certificates for himself and A.G. and a fake ID card bearing his picture and the name of “Michael James Phillips.” Two years later, on February 23, 2001, The Henry County Domestic Relations Court approved a consent judgment entry of divorce. Within weeks of the order Lolita ran away with A.G. and a year later it was released that A.G. had been forcibly abducted from Lolita’s Moscow home. The FBI believed Patrick was responsible. On July 25, 2002, the juvenile court certified that A.G. be put in the temporary custody of the county, as she was not safe with either parent. On September 23, 2002,the juvenile court awarded custody of A.G. to Lolita and granted Patrick unsupervised visitation. In February 2009 A.G. wrote a letter to her father where she stated she had no intention of visiting him in North Carolina again. Based Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16, the court ordered that the motion to terminate visitation filed on behalf of the minor child is denied. The court ruled that A.G. had not met her burden of proof as she failed to be clear and convincing evidence that an extraordinary circumstance exists to terminate her father’s visits.

By: Brooke Woods - Title: Georgia: Supreme Court Awards Primary Physical Custody to Husband

Link for opinion: Title: Georgia: Supreme Court Awards Primary Physical Custody to Husband The Georgia Supreme Court held in Rose v. Rose, 294 GA. 719 (755 S.E.2d 737)(2014) that, after a divorce action brought by the wife, the husband is awarded primary custody of their child. http://www.gasupreme.us/sc-op/pdf/s14f0181.pdf After wife filed a complaint for divorce against her husband, a temporary hearing was held where the husband agreed that wife would have primary physical custody of the child. At the final hearing, husband sought primary physical custody of the child. Wife applied for discretionary appeal where the court didn’t reach a different result. The husband and wife, Bruce and Latosha Rose separated in 2012. The couple lived in Gwinett County where the child attended school until the separation. Latosha moved to Henry County and took their child with her. She then filed a complaint for divorce against Bruce in Gwinett County. Latosha was granted primary physical custody of the child at the temporary hearing. At the final hearing, Bruce voiced his concerns for the child and how his environment with his mother wasn’t the best for the child. He then asked for primary physical custody of the child. The court decided in favor of the husband and granted him primary physical custody of the child. Husband works from home, provides more nutritious meals, and lives within a better ranking school district than wife; therefore, husband better provides the best interest of the child. Wife was awarded joint legal custody. She then sought a discretionary appeal. The appellate court did not interfere with the holding of the trial court because there wasn’t any evidence of abuse of discretion. The court concluded that husband having primary physical custody is in the best interest of the child. This includes evidence that husband is able to spend more time with the child, the child is better behaved when with husband, more nutritious meals are provided, and a better education is available. Temporary custody was awarded to wife and creates an interim arrangement that best serves the child’s interests while adjudication of the rights of the mother and father are pending.

By: Heidi Jo S. - Title: Courts grant petition for Woman after disproving case evidence.

Seilkop v. Barker, 148 So. 3d 865 (2014) Link to opinion: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9972712049165151371&q=child+custody&hl=en&as_sdt=4,10&as_ylo=2014 Title: Courts grant petition for Woman after disproving case evidence. Seilkop had given her eight month old child to the Barkers, the great aunt and uncle of the child, until she could get on her feet financially to support the child. Barkers were rewarded temporary custody of the child. Seilkop went to get her child back and petitioned the courts terminate the temporary custody, but the Barker’s objected to the petition. After an investigation of Seilkop, the courts denied the petition stating that Seilkop was not a fit parent because of three reasons: One being that the apartment she is living in is too close to retention pond and was “unfit and dangerous” and the second being her relationship status and how she had “unstable relationships, domestic violence, and other illegal activities such as underage drinking.” The third being that Seilkop is unable to adequately care for the child during monthly visitations. This case was to show she was a fit parent and that there was no proof that she is not. A fit parent is defined as one who has not abused, abandoned, or neglected the child. They have stated that Seilkop has not abused nor abandoned her child therefore they are stating she has neglected the child. Neglect of a child mean that the child is “deprived of… nessessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.” The first finding that the courts stated made Seilkop an unfit parent states about her apartment being dangerous, this is speculative and does not rise to the level of neglect stated. They have not shown that Seilkop left the child alone in the apartment or that he ever wandered to the nearby pond on his own. Seilkop stated she installed a lock to prevent such an incident from happening. The second finding was about Seilkop’s history of underage drinking and her relationships. This also does not fall under the neglect category. There is no evidence stating that her actions resulted in physical, mental, or emotional harm to the child. The third finding stated that Seilkop was insufficient to care for the child. Mrs. Barker testified stating that the child would come back after a visitation with Seilkop and he would be hot, red-faced and fussy and wearing a dirty diaper with sour milk in his cup. She also testified after more recent visits that the child still appears to be hungry and tired after being returned to them. Although there seems to be no testimony to prove that there was “deprivation” of necessary food, clothing, or shelter. Under these findings the courts denying Seilkop’s petition for her child was not legally supported with any proper evidence. The case as reversed and remanded.

By: Kaylah N. - Title: Kansas: Supreme Court Remands Case Back to District Court due to Misapplied Law in Determining Residential Custody

Kansas: Supreme Court Remands Case Back to District Court due to Misapplied Law in Determining Residential Custody Cheney v. Poore, 339 P.3d 1220 (2014)Jeanna Cheney and Zachary Poore started dating in March 2006, and at that time, she was pregnant with another man’s child. Jocelyn was born in November 2006, and her biological father’s name was not on the birth certificate. Zachary took care of Jocelyn as if she was his biological daughter. In December 2009, Jeanna gave birth to Justine, Zachary’s biological daughter. Throughout the duration of their relationship, they separated several times, but September 2012, is when it officially ended. That was when Jeanna voluntarily admitted herself to a rehabilitation center for detoxification and counseling for polysubstance abuse. The children resided with Zachary while Jeanna was away. After she left rehab, she filed a petition to prove that Zachary was not Jocelyn’s father and she sought temporary custody of Justine. The district court granted temporary custody of both children to Jeanna. Zachary filed a counter petition seeking residential custody of Justine and a continuing relationship with Jocelyn. In January 2013, Jeanna and Zachary agreed that Jeanna will have residential custody and Zachary will get visitation with both children. However, a decision filed in May 2013, stated that both parents were fit to have custody, but because Zachary was not Jocelyn’s biological father or stepfather, he had no right to have custody of her. That was when the district court decided to split custody of the children between Jeanna and Zachary because this was labeled as an exceptional case due to the fact that it would be less stressful for Justine to reside with her father and occasionally leave to visit her mother and sister than to reside with her mother and sister and occasionally leave to visit her father. Jeanna appealed arguing that splitting up the children would be more stressful on them. Zachary argued that Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-3207(b) (2012), which was used in determining residency of the children by labeling this as an exceptional case, should have had no influence on the district court’s decision to give residential custody to him because the statute is only applicable when custody is being determined between full siblings. The Court of Appeals found that the district court did err by applying Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-3207(b) (2012), but they concluded that Kan. Stat.Ann. § 23-3201 (2012), which discusses the best interest for the child, and Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-3203 (2012), which lists factors to determine custody and visitation, were used appropriately to determine residential custody of Justine. Jeanna petitioned the Supreme Court to determine if the Court of Appeals was right in determining that Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-3207(b) (2012), was inapplicable in determining custody and whether or not the district court abused their discretion when they awarded custody of Justine to Zachary. The Supreme Court looked at In re Marriage of Taylor, 2012 WL 1352867, which stated that one important factor to look at when determining custody is the “…interaction and interrelationship of the child with parents, siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests.” The Supreme Court concluded that the district court does not need to find a case exceptional before they divide the custody of half siblings. They also conclude that Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-3207(b) (2012), was misapplied and they reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the district court. Under Cheney v. Poore, 339 P.3d 1220,1227 (2014), the case is remanded “…back to the district court so it can make findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the correct legal standards found in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-3201 (2012) and Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-3203 (2012).” Link to Opinion: http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-Opinions/Opinions/SupCt/2014/20141219/110007.pdf

By: Justina M. - Title: California and Arizona determining the appropriate Jurisdiction to determine child custody of Angel B “Appellant, and Vanessa J “Appellees”.

Link Opinion: Scholar.goggle.com Title: California and Arizona determining the appropriate Jurisdiction to determine child custody of Angel B “Appellant, and Vanessa J “Appellees”. In California (Angel B v. Vanessa J 316 P.3d 1257) N.B. was born and parents were married, In July 2008, the couple separated and later, that year the Mother filed for divorce in Imperial County, California. In December 2008, father and mother had agreed to a parenting plan, Californian court granted mother custody, and Father parenting time. Later on the custody would modify serval times. After the mother was granted custody, she requested to relocate to Orange County, California,they moved in 2010 , then in mid-2011 the mother N.B moved to Arizona and have lived there ever since. However mother never notified California or the father, as she felt she didn’t need to. In 2012 mother filled to terminate the fathers parental rights based on abandonment. In March of 2013 The Maricopa County Superior Court terminated the father’s parental right. Father is appeals. Question is now weather the Maricopa County had Jurisdiction to terminate the father’s parental rights. It’s unclear from the record what alternative may be applicable; it will have further proceedings to determine whether Arizona, rather than California is the appropriate jurisdiction to address severance. Angel B v. VANESSA J., 316 P.3d 1257- Ariz: Court of Appeals, 1st Div. 2014

By: Laura L. By: Minnesota: Appeals Court holds that neglect of a child is a basis for termination of parental rights.

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12861072900952986133&q=child+visitation+2014&hl=en&as_sdt=4,24 Minnesota: Appeals Court holds that neglect of a child is a basis for termination of parental rights. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held IN THE MATTER OF WELFARE OF CHILD OF JBT, No. A14-0960 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2014) that the neglected child, in foster care, serves as a basis for terminating the mother’s rights to her child. Appellant J.B.T. is the mother of D.T., who was born on September 29, 2008. D.T.'s father is not known. In 2000, appellant was in a car accident and suffered brain injury. Appellant also has mental health issues. In February 2013, D.T. was placed in foster care due to possible neglect and/or abuse by his mother, when healthcare officials noticed bruises on D.T., although there was no evidence showing that appellant abused D.T. Due to J.B.T.’s mental health issues, she was required to complete evaluations, enroll in a safety plan, therapy and be consistently active in all services provided in order to be reunited with her son. In December 2013, Clay County filed a petition to terminate appellant’s parent rights on the grounds of an unfit parent. Appellant failed to participate in services offered, i.e. therapy. Appellant participated in visitation with D.T., but left visitations before ending due to J.B.T. acting out uncontrollably. In September 2013, Appellant moved to Fargo, North Dakota. Appellant stopped actively seeking therapy, so the services provided were discontinued. District court held that the state of appellant’s home and parenting surroundings is not relevant in this case, the issue is that due to her chronic mental health issues, she is deemed an unfit parent and cannot care for her child or herself. Because efforts to correct the situation failed, the court determined that there are clear grounds for parent termination. The appellate court affirms the lower court’s decision to terminate appellant’s parent rights when at least one ground for termination is clearly evidenced and efforts to reunite appellant and D.T were made but failed. Grounds for termination are palpable unfitness, correcting the conditions and a child is neglected and placed in foster care. At least one ground is reason for termination. Because D.T. is mentally ill, can cannot be reunited with D.T. Appellant did not work to correct her mental illness, therefore the decision to terminate rights was affirmed.

By: Jamie H. - Title: Louisiana: Appeals Court Holds that Co-Domiciliary Parents is Legal Modification to Joint Custodial Arrangement

Link for Opinion: https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3419803426122682341&hl=en&as_sdt=6,24 Title: Louisiana: Appeals Court Holds that Co-Domiciliary Parents is Legal Modification to Joint Custodial Arrangement The Louisiana Court of Appeals, First Circuit, held in DISTEFANO v. DISTEFANO, No. 2014 CU 1318 (La. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2015), that the parents of said children can be named as co-domiciliary parents and share joint custody, and that the parent requesting a change of a current considered custody decree, does not have to show that the arrangement is deleterious to the children to justify modification, but that if the modification is made, the advantages to the child outweigh any harm. In this case, the mother of the children, Christina Distefano, and father Ryan Distefano had a considered/contested custody agreement/decree from the trial court dated September 3, 2013, in which the court awarded the parties joint custody of their two children and designated Ryan Distefano the domiciliary parent (parent with the authority to make decisions for the child) and Christina with physical custody periods (visitation) every other weekend and Wednesday evenings, with modifications made during the summer, holidays and birthdays. In March, 2014,Christina filed a motion to modify the custody agreement, due to her moving closer to her ex-husband’s residence (same neighborhood) and the children expressing their want of having more time with their mom, and Ryan’s uncooperativeness with the children having a further relationship with their mother. The mother asked for designation as domiciliary parent, equal physical custody, and increased custodial time with the children. On April 29, 2014, the court entered judgment keeping the joint custody the same, but designated both parents as co-domiciliary parents and sharing physical custody on a 50/50 basis (alternating weeks) and slight changes to the holidays and special occasions. Ryan appealed the judgment stating that Christina failed to show her burden of proof. The issues in this case were if Christina bore her burden of proof in showing that: 1) if the current custody agreement were to stay, that the situation was deleterious (harmful or damaging)to the children, or that by changing the current agreement the harm likely caused, did not outweigh the advantages to the children by changing it; and 2) that a change in circumstances had happened since the September 2013 agreement. The appellate court held that the trial court, according to Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So.2d 1193 (La. 1986), and Mulkey v. Mulkey, 2012-2709 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So.3d 357, showed that Christina bore her burden of proof to change the current custody agreement. First, Christina satisfied the change in circumstances by showing that she made the move to be closer to her ex-husband’s home (three streets away) and the children’s school and location of activities and such so that there would be more continuity in the raising of the children and their daily schedules. When the court originally set Ryan as the domiciliary parent it was using the twelve factors of La. C.C. art. 134 in determining the best interest of the children. Second, the appellate court held that Christina fulfilled her burden of proof to modify the physical custody allocation of the joint custody agreement, giving Christina more physical time with the children. Using the standard in Bergeron, Christina had to prove that “the harm” that a change in the custody agreement to give her more time, and change the children’s current schedule, had more advantages than harm. See Bergeron, 492 So.2d at 1199-1200. Even though the situation with the father and the current agreement did not create a deleterious situation, Christina did not have to prove that to get a modification to the custody agreement. The court agreed that in allowing the children to spend more time with their mother, especially when living so close to the other parent, there were only advantages and not harm. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in modifying the custody decree, and that giving the mother, Christina more physical custody time, would not cause an upheaval in the children’s daily schedules and routines and allow the children to spend more time with each parent equally, and only changed the schedule by one week.

BY: Kallie B. - Title: Alabama: Court of Civil Appeals Holds that the Father Will Remain Primary Caregiver over the Children

Link for opinion: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17843428460024397880&q=irions+v.+holt&hl=en &as_sdt=4,1 Title: Alabama: Court of Civil Appeals Holds that the Father Will Remain Primary Caregiver over the Children The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held in Irions v. Holt, No. 2130002, 2014 WL 2535274 (Ala. Civ. App. June 6, 2014) that the father’s military enrollment after the divorce did not change the original judgment awarding him sole physical custody; that giving the mother sole custody, due to the father’s relocation, would not be in the best interests of the children; that the deviation in the child support guidelines regarding travel expense did not apply. The original order in the divorce case Holt v. Holt (No. 2060172, July 2, 2007), 13 So. 3d 454 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)(table), ordered the Petitioner (Autumn Holt n/k/a Irions) to pay child support to the Respondent (Matthew Holt), awarded the Petitioner joint legal custody of the children and standard visitation. Awarded the Respondent sole physical custody of the children. The Petitioner appealed the divorce judgment in August 2007, which the court affirmed without an opinion. The judgment was modified in August 2012, ordering the Petitioner to pay additional child support and the Respondent to provide health care for the children. The Petitioner filed in December 2012 to modify the judgment yet again. This action is what started the Irions v. Holt case. Irions petition alledged that Holt let the children’s health care laps and that she was now providing it, thus her child support payments be recalculated. She filed an amended petition in January 2013 seeking sole physical custody of the children because Holt notified her that he was being relocated due to his enrolment in the Army, and will be moving the children with him to New York. The court entered judgment on the case in June 2013, stating that there will be no modification to the child custody; that the children could be moved to New York with their father; that due to the burden of travel expenses the Petitioner no longer needed to pay child support to the Respondent. Both parties entered a motion to alter, amend, or vacate in July 2013. Petitioner seeking 24 hour notification of deployment. Respondent seeking a change in visitation and asked that the Petitioner pay child support. The Appeals court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on custody, which the children’s best interest is to stay with their father. They reversed the trial court’s judgment on child support,sending it back to the trial court to recalculate a fair amount because both parents need to support their children.